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Abstract:  
 
The key focus of this article is to provide an understanding about the complexities involved in 
global IT outsourcing and the management initiatives needed for the successful implementation 
of a global IT outsourcing partnership. Technological advances combined with increased 
globalization and competitive pressures have forced many firms to consider alternatives that will 
reduce organizational cost, and at the same time create and/or maintain their competitive 
advantage in the global market. Increasingly, the phenomenon of global outsourcing is being 
considered by many firms as a solution to their IT needs and problems. With increasing 
recognition and confidence in the programming competencies of IT workers in India and other 
countries, offshore outsourcing has gained increasing acceptance among U.S firms across all 
industries. 
 
Even though there has been a plethora of studies on domestic outsourcing of information 
systems, the research on outsourcing outside national borders (global outsourcing) has been 
scarce. One of the areas which lacks depth in the literature is in how to manage a global 
outsourcing partnership. Anecdotal evidence points to the fact that even the best outsourcing 
deals can go sour if not managed properly. In the context of global IT outsourcing, the 
management of the outsourcing relationship becomes even more complex because of the 
geographical distance and the difference in the national and organizational cultures of the client 
and vendor firms. This article identifies the key elements that should be considered while 
managing an outsourcing relationship with a foreign’ vendor and the role the manager should 
play in a global outsourcing context. 
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Article:  
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
Most of the extant literature on information technology outsourcing deals with outsourcing 
within national boundaries (domestic outsourcing). It is only recently that many firms have 
begun to look at global IT outsourcing as a more profitable venture than domestic outsourcing. 
We define global IT outsourcing as any contribution to a client organization by one or more 
external vendors with a different country of origin in tangible, intangible, human, and/or 
nonhuman resources related to the IT infrastructure. Like domestic outsourcing, global IT 
outsourcing is also driven by transaction cost economies in terms of personnel (there is a 
significant disparity in cost of labor among developing and underdeveloped countries), skill 
(more efficient programmers at a cheaper cost), and productivity (more productive as compared 
to internal development). But unlike domestic outsourcing, a firm may decide to globally 
outsource part or all of its IT infrastructure for reasons other than that of cost. For example, a 
firm in a one country may decide to tie in with a vendor in another country so as to facilitate its 
product entry into that country. Or, it may opt to globally outsource some of its IT so as to gain 
access to new market opportunities (Heeks. 1996) andlor as an option for developing a global 
information system (Apte & Winniford, 1991). More recently, firms are forming alliances with 
offshore outsourcing firms so as to add value to their competencies irrespective of the cost of the 
alliance. 
 
Key reasons for the phenomenal increase in global information systems outsourcing are the 
current economic situation and the tremendous advances in telecommunications technology. On 
the supplier side, outsourcing provides financial stability to vendors through long-term 
partnerships and increased revenue. And on the buyer side firms are using outsourcing as a 
scalable solution that can be right-sized easily depending on their changing needs. Also, 
technological breakthroughs have allowed geographic boundaries to become blurred and has 
encouraged firms to seek resources from locations that provide the best competitive advantage. 
Some of the key factors influencing the choice of global information systems outsourcing have 
been lower cost, inability to hire and retain qualified personnel in the home country, and the 
increased emphasis on speed, vis-a-vis the time from project initiation to system installation 
(Patane and Jurison, 1994). In case of software development, an additional incentive for firms to 
globally outsource (to developing countries like India) is the high salaries and overhead cost in 
the industrialized nations. 
 
The topic of IT outsourcing management is a relatively unexplored area within the global 
outsourcing research community. Nevertheless, both researchers as well as practitioners agree 
that outsourcing management is one of the most critical factors contributing to the success of an 
outsourcing deal. Unfortunately, the adage, "If at first you don't succeed, try again," is not the 
most effective way of achieving the goals and creating a successful relationship in a global 
outsourcing scenario. 
 
This article puts in perspective the key areas to be considered if a firm wants to create a 
successful relationship with its global outsourcing vendor. We first take a look at some of the 
key research done in the outsourcing area, both on the domestic and the international front. Then 
we look at some key factors that determine the success of a global IT outsourcing relationship. 
Finally, we examine results of a survey conducted on the topic and two case studies in light of 
the concepts presented in the article. 
 
A REVIEW OF IT OUTSOURCING  
 
Managing an outsourcing relationship, especially an offshore one is not an easy task. Simple 
misunderstandings can make even a well-laid out contract get into a dysfunctional relationship. 
As mentioned earlier, the literature related to global IT outsourcing management (GITOM) is not 
very extensive. Nevertheless, a study of past research in domestic and global IT outsourcing in 
general can serve as a point of reference and give us a better perspective in understanding the 
issues related to managing an outsourcing relationship with a foreign vendor. The following 
highlights some of the key research and studies undertaken in the area of domestic and global IT 
outsourcing. 
 
IT Outsourcing  
 
In recent times, IT outsourcing has gained increased prominence, both among academics and 
practitioners, due to the many high profile multi-million dollar cases involving "respectable" 
firms. There is a vast amount of research on domestic IT outsourcing dealing with a host of 
issues like reasons for outsourcing, selection of an outsourcing vendor, consequences of 
outsourcing, risks involved in information systems outsourcing, and the importance of a good 
contract. Since the focus of this paper is on global IT outsourcing relationships, only some of the 
recent key studies in domestic IT outsourcing are summarized below. 
 
 
 
 
The conclusions from these studies emphasize the need for careful planning and implementation 
of the outsourcing arrangement in order to reap significant benefits. When the firm is involved 
with outsourcing vendors based outside of the United States, they have to develop a very 
different strategic and organizational outlook than firms involved only in domestic sourcing. 
Since different cultures communicate distinctively with respect to IT management (Sauter, 1992; 
Ein-dor et al. 1993), it is imperative that one look at these differences when considering a global 
outsourcing arrangement (in addition to the traditional issues like cost, vendor competency, 
technology etc.). To say that these cultural differences play a critical role in the success of the 
relationship is an understatement, as is supported by the fact that many firms looking into 
offshore outsourcing are depending on vendors with cultural specialists in particular countries. 
From a reference point of view, some key studies in the area of global IT outsourcing are 
enumerated below. 
 
 
 
Further reading in the area of global IT outsourcing suggests that there is a scarcity of 
information and studies in the area of (global) outsourcing relationships and their management. 
This article addresses this issue and gives a better understanding of the key principles that are 
required and the different management styles that could be used by executives in creating a 
successful relationship with their global IT vendor. In order to achieve this, the remainder of this 
article focuses on the key elements in managing a global IT outsourcing relationship 
successfully, the issues and problems facing firms involved in global IT outsourcing, and the best 
management strategies under different outsourcing scenarios. 
 
A RESEARCH FRAMEWORK  
 
The following research framework is presented so as to gain a better understanding of the 
outsourcing management process and to put a perspective on the different components involved 
while managing an outsourcing relationship.  
 
The GITOM framework has four major components: influence factors which represents the 
various issues and problems that affect the relationship management in an outsourcing 
arrangement; management strategies, which includes the combination of one or more 
management elements; moderating factors, conditions or characteristics in a relationship that 
changes the 'normal' management style (e.g., age of the partnership, client attributes, vendor 
attributes) and is highly contextual; and lastly performance implications (e.g., effectiveness, 
efficiency, commitment), which are nothing but the dimensions by which the client management 
and the vendor firm agrees on to judge the success of their relationship. The article focuses 
primarily on the issues pertaining to or affecting global IT outsourcing management strategy and 
the primary elements which composes that strategy. 
 
 
 
ELEMENTS OF MANAGEMENT STRATEGY  
 
Relationship management is a complex task. And when the players involved are from different 
cultures as in global IT outsourcing, the task of managing the relationship becomes even more 
difficult. To get a fundamental understanding of this process, and to do a better job of 
management, it is imperative that one understands the underlying dimensions and elements that 
make up the overall management strategy. Based on the broader literature on firm-subunit 
relationships (Doz et al. 1990, Gupta & Govindarajan, 1991), the managerial concepts for global 
IT outsourcing incorporate structural variables (Control Mechanisms, Integrative Mechanisms, 
and Contract Mechanisms), compensation variables (Incentive mechanisms), and process 
variables (Communication Mechanisms, Conflict Resolution Mechanisms). This section provides 
a review of the following elements relevant to the domain of global IT outsourcing management. 
 
Control Mechanisms  
 
"The purpose of control is to minimize idiosyncratic behavior and to hold individuals or groups 
to enunciated policy, thus making performance predictable" (Tannenbaum 1968, p 3). Broadly 
speaking, two categories of control mechanisms can be identified in the literature --formal and 
informal (Jaworski, 1988). In formal control, written, management established mechanisms are 
set down to influence the desired party so as to achieve a desired outcome, where as in informal 
control, the mechanisms are less rigid, unwritten, and typically worker-established (Jaworski, 
1988). Formal control can further be classified into two groups - outcome control and behavior 
(process) control. Gupta and Govindarajan (1991, pp782) expressed these terms as follows: 
"Outcome control can be defined as reliance only on the end results for assessing a subsidiary 
manager's performance, whereas behavior (process) control can be defined as reliance on 
surveillance over the manager's decisions and actions that are expected to produce the hoped-for 
end results." Output control gives the organizational members the flexibility to choose any 
means to achieve a desired outcome. Behavior control, on the other hand, is more restrictive than 
output control and imposes on the members specific constraints with regards to the task at hand.  
 
An example of formal control is the bureaucratic control system. In a bureaucratic system, 
control is established with the help of explicit rules and regulations which specify the desired 
performance in terms of output and/or behavior (Baliga and Jaeger, 1984). As a result, 
performance evaluation in this type of control involves comparing the member's behavior and 
output to a pre-established standard. Training and socialization in this type of control is fairly 
straightforward and simple. New members are indoctrinated about the rules and regulations in 
the organization. 
 
An alternative to bureaucratic control is a cultural control system wherein control is established 
through informal and implicit mechanisms (Baliga and Jaeger, 1984). In a cultural control 
system, the shared values and beliefs within an organization guide the norms and behavior of the 
personnel in that organization. This type of control can be found in organizations with low 
turnover and a strong 'organizational culture' where the employees have accepted the 'company 
way' of doing things. Practices like long-term employment guarantees and consensual decision 
making aid the implementation of a cultural control system by providing the members with 
stability in a cultural group and interaction to assimilate and share the cultural values. Training 
and socialization in a cultural control setting is more critical and extensive than in the 
bureaucratic control system. In addition to the rules and regulations, a member must also absorb 
and accept the 'subtle' and complex control system which is based on a range of 'essential' values 
(Baliga and Jaeger, 1984). Performance evaluation in a cultural control system is done through 
interpersonal interactions. 
 
Within the context of global IT outsourcing, control mechanisms are needed so as to monitor the 
performance of the vendor and to achieve a successful outsourcing partnership with the vendor. 
In short, these strategies refer to the amount and type of "power" the client can execute on the 
vendor. The type of control mechanisms which need to be established will vary from client to 
client depending on the environmental and contextual factors specific to the firm-dyad 
relationship. Vendors from certain nationalities would react to certain control mechanisms more 
favorably than others. The type of control mechanisms suited for a particular global IT 
outsourcing partnership is also dependent on the attributes of the outsourced IT and the cultural 
differences between the client and the vendor organizations. 
 
Inter-organizational Coordination  
 
When two firms enter into a cooperative relationship, the issue of coordination plays an 
important role in the performance of that venture. In any outsourcing relationship, coordination 
between the client and the vendor is a must for the success of that relationship. The emphasis 
here is more on the degree of coordination rather than the actual mechanism of coordination 
itself. Coordination between any two parties can be conceptualized in terms of two dimensions-- 
the breadth of coordination (number of parties involved in the coordination network), and the 
diversity of coordination (the number of functions coordinated). Extending to the global IT 
outsourcing scenario, the amount of coordination required between the client firm and the 
outsourcing vendor will depend on the "volume" of IT outsourced and the extent of vendor 
involvement (Nam et a]., 1996). 
 
Past research (Galbraith, 1977) has identified several key formal structural mechanisms for 
coordination between subunits in an organization. The least complex of these integrative 
mechanisms are liaison positions, and the most complex type is matrix structure. Between these 
two extremes we have two other type of integrative mechanisms, namely cross-unit committees 
and integrator roles. The more complex the integrative mechanism, the more effective the firm-
dyad will be in processing information and in coordinating the activities between interdependent 
units. On the other hand, the more complex the mechanism is, the more costly it is to implement 
such a mechanism. 
 
To summarize, the 'coordination' element of management strategy refers to the degree of 
integration between the client firm and a vendor firm in a global IT outsourcing context. The 
more sophisticated the coordination mechanism between the vendor and the client, the more 
efficient the ability to process and exchange information. The degree of coordination will also be 
affected by the attributes of transaction in the outsourcing relationship. 
 
For the successful management of any outsourcing relationship, the client firm should first look 
at what is being outsourced, how critical is the outsourced IT to the rest of the firm's operations, 
and what impact does the outsourced IT have on the success of the firm in the market place 
before it decides on a coordinating mechanism. 
 
Contract Specificity  
 
One of the basic requirements of a good outsourcing partnership is a good contract. The "science 
of the contract" plays an important role in determining the success of an outsourcing deal 
(Pastore, 1996). As one trade journal puts it, "The key to managing the outsourcing vendor is the 
contract. The contract establishes, among other things, the cost for processing at various levels of 
use, specifies the acceptable performance parameters, provides penalties for substandard 
performance and details the terms under which the relationship can be terminated" 
(Computerworld, January 8, 1990: p72). When the outsourcing deal involves a vendor from 
another country, it becomes even more imperative that certain amount of flexibility be built into 
the contract to handle future contingencies. Contingent clauses built into the contract would 
come into effect under certain mutually agreed upon 'parameter changes'. Even under relatively 
'stable' conditions, incomplete contracts are a useful tool for the management of a global IT 
outsourcing relationship. As Doz, Prahalad, and Hamel (1990, pp143) puts it, "... over time 
partners are likely to develop a better mutual understanding, a more realistic assessment of the 
potential value of their contribution, of the conditions needed for value creation, a greater 
appreciation of each other's modus operandi and cultures, as well as (hopefully) more trust. This 
may usefully lead them to renegotiate their agreements to improve effectiveness over time." In 
short, the degree of contract specificity could affect the outcome and success of a global 
outsourcing deal over time 
 
The 'contract specificity' element of the global IT outsourcing management strategy helps the 
client in deciding when to have a highly specific contract and when the contract can be less 
comprehensive without undue risk or loss to the firm. In other words, it aids the client firm in 
making a decision on the amount of flexibility that should be built into the contract during 
renegotiation or modification of the original contract. 
 
Collaborative Communication.  
 
The intensity of communication between any two organizations can be conceptualized in terms 
of four dimensions: frequency, informality, openness, and the density (bidirectionality) of 
communication. The density of communication was defmed by Gupta & Govindarajan (1991) as 
"the number of people in the two units who interact with each other across organizational 
boundaries." It has been found that increased levels of these dimensions are associated with 
increased commitment, satisfaction, and coordination. Also establishing good collaborative 
communication channels creates an atmosphere of mutual support and respect, which in turn 
impact the success of the partnership. 
 
On another level, the choice of a particular communication channel in a global IT outsourcing 
relationship would depend on the nature of the outsourced IT and the environmental contexts 
surrounding that partnership (Spee, 1994). In their study, Daft and Lengel (1986) clarified the 
difference between the amount of information transmitted through a medium and the medium's 
richness. They also argued that the under conditions of high uncertainty, the amount of 
information transmitted would be high; and under conditions of high equivocality, the media 
should be rich enough to facilitate debate and clarification (Daft and Lengel, 1986). It has also 
been suggested that situational factors, symbolic considerations and social influence play a role 
in the selection of a particular medium for communication (Markus 1992, cited in Spee 1994). 
 
Essentially, the 'communication' element of the global IT outsourcing management strategy 
represents the type and quality of communication channels which need to be established between 
the vendor and the client. Certain outsourcing contexts call for establishing a very informal and 
open communication channels between many people from both the client and the vendor firms. 
On the other hand, for certain outsourcing scenarios, a one person formal link between the client 
and the vendor is enough. Proper management of communication between the client and the 
vendor would enhance the performance of the outsourcing relationship 
 
Conflict Management  
 
Since global IT outsourcing involves players from different organizations and nationality, it is 
almost inevitable that conflicts would arise during the course of the relationship. It has been 
stipulated that when decisions are made by a 'coalition', the coalition members may differ in the 
interpretation of a given situation, and may pursue different priorities, which in turn results in 
conflicts regarding the importance of various factors (Ungson et al. 1981). The nature and 
structure of conflicts (negotiation problem) and its resolution would very much depend on the 
specific outsourcing context in terms of the level of interdependency and the environmental 
attributes. In many instances, negotiations during conflict resolution often end in 'suboptimal' 
agreements (Mumpower 1991). As Raiffa (1982) puts it, "Often, disputants fail to reach an 
agreement when, in fact, a compromise does exist that could be to the advantage of all 
concerned. And the agreements they do make are frequently inefficient: they could have made 
others that they all would have preferred" (p.358). 
 
With regards to global IT outsourcing relationships, conflict management strategies are devised 
for those cases where the "...individuals are in conflict because they want different things, but 
must settle for the same thing" (Mumpower 1991, p. 1305). Within the context of a global IT 
outsourcing partnership, the problem of conflict management is compounded because the level 
of 'importance' placed by the client and the vendor on a particular issue may differ considerably 
(Clark, 1993). It is also contended that because of the 'global' nature of the client-vendor 
relationship, optimal conflict management strategies would vary from vendor to vendor. For 
example, it has been suggested that for transactions which are low on assetspecificity, non-
relational conflict resolution modes, such as switching and litigation, would be more efficient 
than other conflict resolution modes (Spee, 1994). This is because, under conditions of low asset-
specificity, neither parties are inclined to be committed to each other. On the other hand, when 
asset specificity is high, the service provider (vendor) has a vested interest in the transaction and 
conflict resolution is better achieved by relational conflict resolution modes, such as appeals to 
shared values and internal hierarchy (Speer 1994). 
 
On another dimension, two general strategies of concession can be identified to solve conflicts 
arising from an outsourcing relationship. The first strategy, compromise, involves both the 
parties agreeing to position intermediate between each other's initial bargaining positions for a 
particular issue under consideration. The second strategy, horse trading or logrolling, consists of 
each party agreeing to trade-offs such that each party gets what they want on certain issues 
(Mumpower, 1991; Forman and Cohen, 1970). 
 
To summarize, since global IT outsourcing arrangement calls for a 'coalition' between two 
parties with different nationalities, it is inevitable that certain conflicts may arise during the 
course of the partnership. These disagreements may manifest themselves in the form of "conflict 
of interest" (the client and the vendor do not agree on the preferred outcome from doing a 
particular task), 'conflict of understanding' (where in the client and the vendor disagree over the 
optimal way to approach a problem or to attain a shared goal), and/or 'conflicting ideologies' (the 
client and the vendor have a clash of ideologies resulting from national and organizational 
differences) (Druckman, 1993). Conflict management strategies are needed to facilitate the 
resolution of these conflicts if sustainable benefits are to be obtained from the outsourcing 
relationship. The type of conflict resolution strategies employed would depend on situational 
factors like the nature of the conflict, cultural background of the conflicting parties and the level 
of conflict. 
 
INFLUENCE FACTORS IN MANAGING GLOBAL IT OUTSOURCING 
RELATIONSHIPS  
 
There are a variety of issues and factors that has a direct impact on how the aforesaid 
management elements are combined to makeup a global IT outsourcing management strategy. 
These issues are highly contextual both from a intra and inter firm point of view, and any client 
firm would do well to study them carefully before deciding on how to manage their global IT 
vendor. 
 
1. A key issue is whether the IT being outsourced plays a central role in the core strategy of the 
firm. The strategic impact of the outsourced IT to the client firm's operation and success would 
shape its managerial response in terms of the nature of interorganizational relationship with the 
vendor firm. Another issue the client firm should determine is the degree of criticality of the 
outsourced IT vis-a-vis the operation and success of the organization. The criticality of the 
outsourced IT would determine the degree of control and delegation to be exercised in an 
outsourcing relationship (Ang, 1993). 
 
2. Technological uncertainty is another key problem facing the managers in a global IT 
outsourcing relationship (Ang, 1993). In an IT outsourcing arrangement, uncertainty could result 
from human actions such as strategic nondisclosure, disguise, or distortion of information (Loh, 
1993; Williamson, 1986). As a result of such uncertainty, one of the parties in the exchange 
would be tempted to act in an opportunistic manner. Another form of uncertainty pertains to the 
technology being outsourced. First, there is the issue dealing with the kind of technology being 
used to fulfill the contract: is it state of the art, is it going to become obsolete in the next couple 
of years, is it difficult to maintain and troubleshoot, etc.? Also, specification adjustments are 
needed as new technological developments take place. Technological uncertainty becomes 
especially acute in the case of emerging technologies. 
 
3. Another factor affecting the choice of a particular management strategy is the degree of 
functional complexity in the outsourced IT. Ang (1993, pp40) refers to functional complexity as 
"the difficulty of coordinating an increasing number of differentiated yet interrelated activities in 
IS services." The major activities associated with IS services include: developing an IS strategy, 
IT planning, capacity management, production management, human resource management, 
security management, PC management, and network management (Cash et al. 1988; Ang 1993). 
Sometimes, the clients run a variety of software applications on geographically dispersed 
platforms using different computer configurations. The complexity of the outsourced IT brings in 
additional issues to be considered while devising a successful global IT management strategy. 
 
4. One issue which has a direct impact on the 'control' and 'coordination' element of the global IT 
outsourcing management strategy is the procedural knowledge, which refers to "the degree to 
which the task activities can be defined or to which cause-effect knowledge is clear" 
(Ramaswami 1996). Procedural knowledge is high for those IT applications that are routine, 
clear, and where the information requirements are unambiguous (Leifer and Mills 1996). The 
level of procedural knowledge in an outsourcing relationship can also be viewed in terms of the 
uncertainty and equivocality present in the 'task' performed by the vendor. Uncertainty has been 
defined as "the difference between the amount of information required to perform the task and 
the amount of information already possessed by the organization" (Galbraith 1977). 
Equivocality, on the other hand, implies the presence of multiple and conflicting interpretations. 
Outsourcing contexts with a high level of procedural knowledge can be said to have high 
information certainty and low equivocality (Leifer and Mills 1996). 
 
5. In a global IT outsourcing scenario, asset specificity becomes a major cause of concern when 
managing the outsourcing relationship. Whether it is technological resource specificity (explicit 
usage of hardware, software, communication architechtures etc) or human resource specificity 
(unique experience, knowledge, and skills the vendor has), the client firm has to incorporate 
certain elements into their management strategy so that the vendor does not take undue 
advantage of the situation and also so that they don't have to be exclusively be dependent on the 
'good-faith behavior' of the vendor. 
 
6. One of the major issues faced by the client firm in managing a global IT outsourcing 
relationship is the difference in culture between their firm and the vendor firm. Since the 
outsourcing arrangement involves a difference in the country of origin of the vendor and the 
client, cultural differences assume a very crucial role in the management of the outsourcing 
relationship. A very good grasp of the cultural differences between different countries can be 
learnt by looking at the dimensions put forth by Hofstede (1980). In his study, Hofstede 
delineated the cultural variations between nations along four dimensions: individualism, power 
distance, uncertainty avoidance, and masculinity. 
 
7. And lastly, the degree of interdependency between the client and the vendor firm could pose a 
problem for the client firm if not managed properly. Depending on whether the interdependency 
(Thompson, 1967) is pooled (the client and the vendor firms share common resources but are 
otherwise autonomous), sequential (the 'output' of the vendor firm is used as an input by the 
client organization), or reciprocal (both the client and the vendor organizations use each other's 
'output' for their operation), the management of .the global IT outsourcing relationship becomes 
more involved and complicated. 
 
EVIDENCE AND RESULTS  
 
To determine some of the issues in global IT outsourcing, and to learn about the different 
management strategies used by managers in successfully managing their outsourcing 
relationships, a study was conducted of IS managers in a select group of fifty firms involved in 
global IT outsourcing. The study included a survey. The breakdown of responses in various key 
categories are as follows: 
 
 
 
Other qualitative results and implications from this study are summarized below 
 
1. There was a direct relationship between the age of the partnership and the scope of the 
outsourcing contract. This suggests that the longer a client firm has been dealing with a particular 
global vendor, the more the degree of mutual trust they developed in each other. This in turn 
motivated the client firm to outsource more of their IT activities to that particular vendor. Also, 
the longer the working relationship between the client and the vendor firms, the more stable the 
'understanding' they have in terms of management expectations and performance. 
 
2. Among a variety of attributes and factors offered as the reason for choosing a particular global 
IT outsourcing vendor, most firms picked 'competitive pricing' and 'Similarities in corporate 
culture' as the two most important factors. This should not come as a surprise as the closer the 
global vendor is to the client firm in terms of culture, the more easily can the client firm identify 
with and manage the outsourcing relationship. 
 
3. Contrary to what was expected, many firms with a sophisticated software portfolio and 
different hardware platforms had insignificant monitoring systems in place to monitor their 
vendor's performance. At first this came as a surprise, but then it was attributed to the fact that 
the global IT vendor had much more expertise in these 'state-of-the-art' technologies than the 
client firm, and the client firms were happy to just concentrate on their core businesses and give 
the vendor the flexibility to do as they see fit (with respect to the outsourced activity). This was 
further confirmed by the fact that many clients let their vendors do the forecasting when it came 
to 'technological trends' vis-a-vis the outsourced function. It is also interesting to note here that 
some firms' decision to 'stay way' was partly because of the differences in culture between their 
firm and their global vendor. 
 
4. Firms outsourcing strategic applications had very formal communication channels and explicit 
control mechanisms established with their global vendors. This in line with the fact that strategic 
applications drive the core business of the client firm and thus the client firms were less willing 
to give the vendor complete autonomy in their activities. Also, formal communication channels 
and explicit contracts reduced the chances of any misunderstanding later on in the relationship. 
 
5. Firms who successfully managed their relationship with global vendors from "collectivistic" 
culture countries (e.g., India) had a lot of flexibility built into their control and monitoring 
mechanisms. Global vendors from these countries were more accepting of the client firm's values 
and philosophies and were more willing to accept changes. In turn the client firms were more 
flexible in how these firms were monitored in terms of their tasks and performance. 
 
6. It came as no big surprise that many client firms who had outsourced their IT applications to 
vendor from countries with a culture distinctly different from theirs had an outcome based 
control mechanism in place to manage the relationship. This is understandable since an outcome 
based control eliminated the need for extensive interaction with the vendor firm and thus reduced 
the chances of any misunderstandings. 
 
7. In cases where the outcomes were not readily measurable (low performance documentation), 
client firms used a process control approach to measure the vendor performance and maintain a 
successful outsourcing relationship. By constraining and 'measuring' the subtasks involved in the 
outsourcing application, the client firm eliminated the trouble of keeping up with rapidly 
changing technology or changing standards. 
 
Next, we present two case studies and apply our research framework to develop insights into 
global IT outsourcing management. 
 
Citicorp Development Center and i-flex solutions limited1 
 
http://www.outsourcing-research.com/banners/everest/offshoreisnotoffhand.pdf 
 
Offshore outsourcing proponents often tout the differences in time zones between the two parties 
as a highly beneficial arrangement that facilitates time to market. Marketing teams present the 
12-hour time difference between India and California or the eight-hour difference from New 
York to Russia, for example, as a means of obtaining 24-hour work crews on development 
projects or 2417 coverage for support projects. 
 
The outsourcing arrangement in this case study highlights what can happen when there are time 
zone and distance factors impacting the relationship. 
 
Background Situation: Citicorp Development Center, a business unit of Citigroup, developed 
and produces a home banking software product ("Direct Access"), together with middleware that 
allows the product to integrate with all the front-end systems and mainframe systems throughout 
the Citigroup consumer businesses worldwide. 
 
Because the Japanese marketplace has unique complexities from differences in coding for 
language characters as well as banking business requirements and offerings, Citicorp decided to 
outsource the application development and system integration of its Direct Access product for 
Citibank Japan. The decision to outsource was based on the need to ramp up quickly to meet the 
requirements of Citibank Japan, not allowing Citicorp enough time to find and recruit full-time 
employees with the right skill sets. 
 
i-flex solutions limited was selected to handle the Citicorp projects because the outsourcer had 
staff on board with the requisite skills and also presented a compelling economic structure during 
the vendor evaluation process. 
 
Time Zone Factors: The parties began experiencing problems as soon as they started 
transitioning the work to the offshore outsourcer. Steve Saussy, Citicorp Development Center's 
product manager, says the problems were overcome only through teamwork efforts from both 
parties. The i-flex team is located in Mumbai (formerly known as Bombay), India. When it's 
5:00 P.M. at Citicorp, it's 5:30 A.M. in Mumbai. "If we want to talk to them, we have to call 
them before they leave for work or after they get to work," explains Saussy, "and it takes most of 
them about an hour to an hour and a half to get to work. So we either have to stay up really late 
to catch them when they get in first thing, or we have to get up really early in the morning to talk 
to them at the end of their day." This limited window of time for communications means there 
must be minimal mistakes, for each mistake can cost a day's time. 
 
In theory, Citicorp saw the offshore outsourcing as a way to achieve a 24-hour continuous 
development cycle. The people at i-flex would work their 12-hour day, and then they would hand 
off the project to Citicorp people who would plug it into their platform, finalize it and get it 
ready to ship to Japan, and then tell the i-flex team to send the next increment. In reality, there 
are problems if, for example, an i-flex worker hands off software via the server to Citicorp and, 
upon downloading, the Citicorp worker discovers it's missing a file. If the two teams are working 
side-by-side in the same time zone, that takes five minutes to resolve. Similarly, a 12-hour time 
difference can cause the parties to lose a day of production if a requirements document doesn't 
arrive when expected by the offshore team. The team members 12,000 miles away can spend a 
day sitting there twiddling their thumbs while waiting for the requirements. 
 
Citicorp and i-flex worked through their time zone difficulties by taking a teamwork approach 
and ensuring that there were people on both sides of the world who were willing to get up early 
and stay up late. Building a good relationship among management of both teams is also crucial. 
Saussy says a buyer organization must build a relationship with its outsourcer so that the 
offshore team will let the onshore team know something has happened that may cause people to 
be idle and get behind schedule or otherwise run up the tab. 
 
Citicorp's theory in using an offshore team as a strategy to get 24-hour development cycles was 
not misplaced. However, management controls need to be put in place upfront to overcome the 
obstacles in making sure that happens. 
 
Analysis: We see from the above Case study that the outsourcing relationship between Citicorp 
and I-flex would not have been successful if both firms had not realized the key influence factors 
driving the success of their relationship and if they had failed to take appropriate corrective 
measures. In this case, control was one of the key issues: Citicorp had to know what the offshore 
team is doing and to make sure that there are strict quality checks in place (necessary especially 
if you are working on a tight timeline). Another success factor in this relationship was 
interorganizational coordination and collaborative communication. To really leverage the time-
difference and create a profitable alliance, Citicorp had to make sure that there are robust 
coordination mechanisms in place between their team and the offshore team. This is necessary to 
ensure a smooth hand-off and to avoid any rework that would negate the 2417 coverage effect. 
Part of the success also depended on having an open communication channel, including giving 
the offshore team remote access to the buyer's network and software archives. 
 
Case Study: Duty-Free Shop Group and Cognizant Technology Solutions  
 
In any outsourcing relationship, there must be a concerted effort from both parties at the outset to 
build a new culture. They must understand how each company normally operates in such matters 
as proactive or reactive approaches; their decision-making processes; and the speed, flexibility 
and aggressive attitude toward escalating solutions to unexpected challenges. Adding language 
nuances, national differences in mannerisms and relationship approaches can inherently make an 
offshore outsourcing arrangement even more challenging. 
 
Recognizing these potential issues, some companies are taking a more prudent approach toward 
working with an offshore outsourcer to minimize risks in cultural difficulties. This case study is 
an example of such a careful approach: starting with small projects and making sure things work 
well before ramping up. 
 
Background Situation: Duty-Free Shop Group operates airport stores and off-airport stores in 
travel destinations. Located in Hawaii, Mid Pacific, Guam and Sai Pan, Asia, Singapore, Hong 
Kong, Malaysia, Korea, Sydney, and airport shops in throughout the continental U.S., Duty-Free 
sells liquor, tobacco and fragrance and luxury-brand items to travelers. Duty-Free's core 
expertise involves managing its supply chain from the manufacturer to the point where travelers 
purchase goods. In 1999, with 15 years old legacy systems that were complex to maintain, the 
company faced major investments in bringing its IT staff skills up to world class level in order to 
achieve faster, higher-quality support services with lower operating costs. It chose, instead, to 
partner with an outsourcer with IT expertise. 
 
Ron Glickman, Duty-Free's vice president of Information Technology, says his company looked 
at outsourcers in the emerging market of Eastern Europe but moved on because of political 
instabilities. Ireland and European outsourcers didn't present the long-term cost advantages. 
Their due diligence convinced them that India was a more mature market with significant market 
competition. Cognizant was selected because of its outstanding research and development 
capabilities and because it demonstrated flexibility and a willingness to change if things weren't 
working well. 
 
Strategy of Starting Slow: They started by outsourcing the production support process to 
Cognizant, which uses an onshore/offshore model. At the outset, Duty-Free carved out only a 
small piece of its system, minimizing risks while giving the supplier the opportunity to prove it 
could make beneficial changes. Once the kinks were worked out, they moved to phase two, 
referred to as "Follow the Sun" support. In this phase, the supplier began taking production 
support calls from the data center and business users. The next step was a full-blown support 
agreement, turning over responsibility for maintenance and enhancements of Duty-Free's legacy 
systems around the world. Support services for systems and applications in Duty-Free's data 
centers in North American, Hawaii, Mid-Pacific, Asia, and Oceania regions are now 
consolidated at Cognizant in India. 
 
The progression in services has been accompanied by a progression in pricing structure. The 
parties began working together under a series of 90-day agreements as they learned about each 
other and experimented with the best ways to make their relationship work. For a year and a half, 
each new project or new phase of expanded services was handled with a separate work order 
under the umbrella master agreement signed in May 2000. Once the complete responsibility for 
support and maintenance was ready to be turned over to Cognizant, they signed a letter of intent 
in August 2001 for a new three-year agreement. The new outsourcing agreement includes 
gainsharing incentives for the supplier to reduce Duty-Free's seven million lines of code and 
number of programs. 
 
Flexibility: Duty-Free's best practice of steady progression of increasing supplier responsibility 
seemed to work well. Duty- Free learned the value of having selected a supplier willing to be 
flexible and make changes. Glickman explains, "We found that the onshore resources were not 
as effective working with our business partners as we had hoped. So we sat down with Cognizant 
and talked to them about that, and two things happened. They changed some of the people. Also 
we took more responsibility for the relationship and focused Cognizant more on the offshore 
components of technical delivery, which is their expertise. So we basically adapted the 
onshore/offshore model to work better in our environment. They are also good at bringing teams 
on demand to look at new technology opportunities for our new retail ideas. For instance, we are 
building a new store that will have plasma screens and video in the screens with content to attract 
customers to particular brands or products. So we brought Cognizant to help us look at what we 
can to do from a technology side to make that work." 
 
Duty-Free believes the first key to success in offshore outsourcing is to perform due diligence to 
ensure the supplier selected is the right partner for the long term and is capable of bending to 
meet the buyer's special needs. 
 
Analysis: This case study shows the importance of culture and the need for proper conflict 
management in a global outsourcing relationship. Given that the buyer and the vendor are from 
two different countries, it is almost inevitable that certain challenging differences can arise 
during the course of the partnership. Duty-Free handled the situation well with their relationship 
with Cognizant by starting off with small projects while they "learned" the social and corporate 
culture of the offshore vendor firm. The other aspect of this relationship was that the agreement 
between Duty-Free and Cognizant included gainsharing incentives that sewed as motivators to 
resolve conflicts faster and move along. Once the buyer firm has gone through various stages of 
testing and feels very comfortable with the culture of their offshore vendor, they can scale the 
'pilot' project to include other significant processes. This ensures that when the relative 
magnitude (both in terms of dollars and size) of the outsourcing projects increases, the errors and 
pitfalls are reduced to a minimum. 
 
CONCLUSIONS  
 
In conclusion, outsourcing is a great strategy for a number of reasons, provided the decision is 
arrived through a well-thought out process. Whether it is traditional outsourcing of simple IT 
processes, or the outsourcing of entire infrastructures through Netsourcing, a client can benefit 
from following a certain set of guidelines. Listed below are a few key areas which should be 
considered by an organization before they delve into any form of outsourcing. 
 
1. Define precisely what you want to outsource. Are you planning to outsource IT staffing, or the 
entire IT and network infrastructure. Or maybe you only want to outsource the database 
maintenance part of your business. This step is critical as your needs and goals as to what you 
want outsourced has a direct bearing on who and what kind of outsourcing provider you will be 
looking for.  
 
2. Do your homework when selecting an outsourcer. This is specially true in areas like ASP 
outsourcing as the entire ASP market is relatively new and unstable. Check on attributes like: are 
they publicly traded; are they listed on any exchanges; do they have staying power etc.  
 
3. Select an outsourcing provider that can grow with you and can scale their services easily as 
your business flourishes.  
 
4. Have clear metrics or Service Level Agreements (SLA) and process boundaries that would 
define a successful relationship with your Outsourcing provider.  
 
5. Study the provider's business model and have contracts that would contribute to mutual 
profitability.  
 
6. If possible, have the outsourcing provider assign one empowered 'Project Manager' 
responsible for all activities vis-21-vis the outsourced area. This ensures responsibility on the 
part of the provider and also establishes a feedback path between the company and the 
outsourcing provider. 
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